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Foreword 
There is increasing public concern in New Zealand about environmental issues. This 
concern has been fuelled by mounting evidence of a global environmental crisis, and the 
realisation that New Zealand does have its share of environmental problems. Economic 
development has not taken sufficient account of environmental risk, and the environment 
has been subject to considerable stress as a result. In some cases social, ecological and 
economic values have been ignored, and the environment's ability to meet the needs of 
future generations has been compromised. With the legal adoption of the principle of 
sustainable management through the Resource Management Bill, existing and future 
developments need to be assessed for the risks they pose to future generations' wellbeing 
which includes their environment. 
In this guide, which is the product of an ongoing research programme at the Centre for 
Resource Management, approaches to environmental risk assessment are outlined. 
Consideration is given to both the general character of the assessment process and the 
nature of specific techniques used within the process. 
Environmental risk assessment can be used to provide information to resource managers 
on all decisions affecting the environment, including issues such as pesticide!herbicide use, 
sewage disposal, siting of hazardous plant and storage facilities, land classification and 
land-use controls, pollution discharges and economic strategies. The techniques involving 
environmental issues outlined in this guide will help decision makers to increase the 
likelihood that outcomes from decisions involving environmental issues will be sustainable. 
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1 Introduction 
In the context of this guide, environmental risk refers to all risk to the environment 
resulting from human development. The term 'environment' covers many aspects 
including: 'modified' environments such as cities and farmland; natural environments, for 
example forests, lakes and wilderness areas; and people, who are an integral part of the 
'environment'. Therefore, environmental risk can encompass a wide range of issues, 
including health risk, for example the effects of pesticide use; financial risk, such as the 
cost of pollution clean-ups; and risk to the social fabric, for example the dislocation of 
society due to human-induced disasters. 
The purpose of environmental risk assessment is to provide information about the 
possible environmental effects of a decision. This information can then be assimilated 
into decision-making processes or used to give advice to specific groups, such as land 
managers in erosion-prone areas, or visitors to sensitive ecological areas. Often, risk 
assessment information is used to evaluate different managetnent options. 
1.1 Purpose 
This guide has two major functions. Firstly it provides a brief summary of the concepts 
used in discussing risk. Secondly, it outlines the characteristics of the risk assessment 
process and the specific approaches and techniques used within the process. A minimum 
number of references are given and the reader is referred to a selection of key items for 
further background reading. Where possible, New Zealand examples of the use of risk 
assessment procedures are cited. 
Some suggestions for selecting risk assessment approaches and techniques are made in 
this guide. However, because risk assessment procedures vary from situation to situation 
(e.g. depending on the nature of risk, site of the risk), this guide avoids stating which 
techniques and approaches should be used. Rather, the selection of a technique and 
approach will call on the expertise of the risk analyst. 
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1.2 Context and application 
New Zealand currently enjoys a 'clean-green' image. However, this impression is relative 
and results from a comparison of New Zealand's environmental problems with those 
being experienced by the rest of the world. In fact New Zealand does have significant 
environmental problems that require attention such as soil erosion, groundwater 
contamination, and the siting of landfills. 
The task of incorporating the concept of environmental risk into the decision-making 
process has been receiving a great deal of attention overseas in recent years due to the 
increasing number of environmental problems being experienced and the larger and 
larger sums of money being sunk into solving them1. A major reason why these 
environmental problems occurred is because decision-making processes did not 
adequately assess risk to the environment. 
The warnings from overseas experiences are clear. Without incorporating the concept 
of environmental risk into decision-making processes the size and number of 
environmental problems in New Zealand will continue to increase because 
environmentally damaging outcomes from decisions will not be adequately catered for. 
This is a crucial point for a country that relies on its environmental resource base (e.g. 
agriculture) for its social and economic sustainability. 
The public sector has primary responsibility for environmental management. There are 
many tools that public sector agencies can use to plan the uses to be made of the 
environment, such as land classification, water classification, water right approvals, 
catchment management plans, economic strategies. Environmental risk assessment can 
be used to provide information for virtually all planning tools. 
1.3 Structure 
This guide is divided into two sections. Section A provides an overview of the risk 
assessment process. In Section B some of the common techniques and approaches used 
to assess risk are described. Some risk assessments in New Zealand are discussed and 
at the end of Section B the key points are summarised. The guide concludes with a list 
of suggested reading and a glossary. 
1 For example, the USEP A's toxic waste dump 'superfund' clean-ups. 
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Section A Overview of the risk assessment process 
The aim of this section is to describe the process of environmental risk assessment. This 
section begins by considering the participants involved in the process of assessing 
environmental risk. It continues with the definition of some key concepts and concludes 
with the description of the risk assessment process. 
2 The participants in the risk assessment process 
Throughout this guide mention is made of the 'participants' or 'players' in the risk 
assessment process. These are now identified. 
The aim of environmental risk assessment is to provide information to the decision-
making process. Decisions are made by various types of agencies (both public and 
private) at different levels, either national, regional or local. This guide is concerned 
primarily with decision making at the regional government le~el. 
There are three main groups of participants who may be involved in environmental risk 
issues at the 'regional' level of decision making. 
Groups within the community who are either directly or indirectly affected, including 
business, recreational and user groups and government sector representatives from 
district, regional or central levels such as the Department of Conservation, the 
Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment. 
Analysts or 'experts', who attempt to assess risk objectively on the basis of various 
assumptions. 
backgrounds. 
Often analysts have scientific, engineering or mathematical 
The decision maker, who has the responsibility for making a decision. 
2 May be an individual, a group of people or an agency. 
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3 Risk and uncertainty in the decision-making process 
3.1 Introduction: the nature of risk 
Risk cannot be defined with absolute accuracy because we cannot measure risk until after 
events have happened. While we can estimate risk now we cannot measure it now 
because of the uncertainty associated with both the probabilities of an occurrence and the 
outcomes. These uncertainties force the decision maker to deal with many aspects of risk 
assessment using subjective rather than objective methods3• 
The decision-making process usually takes information from three mam sources: 
technical, social and managerial. The information provided from these broad areas may 
vary due to uncertainties in assessing risk and different perceptions of risk. It is likely to 
be the decision maker's responsibility to decide which perspective is given precedence. 
Most situations involving risk require the decision maker to make value judgements about 
the particular situation. Situations involving risk are often unique in terms of their 
physical, social and technical factors and there are often site-specific uncertainties. 
However, there are some general principles for environmental risk assessment that can 
be followed. 
This section begins by considering the characteristics of risk and the related subject area 
of uncertainty, then examines the broad categories of risk that a decision maker may want 
to include in a risk assessment process. The information presented in this section is 
mainly found in Gough (1988) and Gough (1990). 
3.2 Characteristics of risk 
Any decision that has the potential to have some environmental impact will have an 
associated environmental risk. 
3 Outcomes cannot be predicted in the face of uncertainty, thus value judgements need to be made 
about outcomes in uncertain situations. When uncertainty is present there can be no 'objectivity'. 
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Risk (encompassing environmental risk) has three basic elements (Figure 1): 
... a choice of action (can be to remain with the status quo) which leads to, 
.. events that have a probability of occurrence, 
_ these events are associated with outcomes, which are often expressed in terms like 
'magnitude', 'consequence', 'severity' or 'significance'. Negative outcomes are often 
called 'hazards'. 
Choice of action 
Action 
Figure 1 Characteristics of risk. 
Possible 
outcome 
Probability of 
Probability 
Possible 
--"::';'1 outcome 
Set of outcomes 
Risk concerns the probability of an outcome and the magnitude of the outcome. Similar 
outcomes with similar probabilities may have different magnitudes depending on 
environmental factors. For example, if the possible outcome is an oil spill the magnitude 
of this outcome will be larger near a marine reserve than on the open sea. Determining 
risk can be very subjective and is associated with uncertainty. 
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3.3 Characteristics of uncertainty 
Uncertainty in the probability and magnitude of an outcome occurs when (Figure 2): 
.. there is a problem in 'defining the issues'\ 
.. the probability of an outcome occurring is unknown, 
.. the set of outcomes is unknown, or 
.. magnitudes associated with outcomes are unknown (e.g. how 'significant' is an 
outcome?). 
Outcome ~ with uncertain 
Choice of action I Uncertainty in magnitude 
probability of "-----____ -------' 
Unce~~inty in problem occurrence 
defimtlon 
Action Probability 
Uncertain 
outcome 
Set of outcomes 
Figure 2 Characteristics of uncertainty. 
Reducing uncertainty is in most instances desirable. However, before uncertainty can be 
reduced, it must be identified. Two approaches to reducing uncertainty are outlined. 
The first way of identifying the presence of uncertainty involves seeking advice from many 
groups, including those at the community and expert level. Uncertainty exists if there is 
substantial disagreement as to what the 'problem' is, the levels of probability associated 
with outcomes, the likely set of outcomes, the magnitude of outcomes. 
4 This concept is based on a branch of public policy theory that considers that the definition of the 
problem determines the outcome. Therefore, uncertainty in outcomes can depend on problem 
definition. 
6 
The corollary to this definition is that the identification of uncertainty will depend on the 
nature of the groups involved in the risk assessment process and the different perceptions 
they have. 
fI ••• PA C assumed certain conditions and 
these could not be met when 2,4,5-Twas used 
in the 'field' ". 
The second approach to identifying the 
presence of uncertainty applies to 
situations where the decision maker only 
uses expert assessments of risk. An 
expert's analysis of risk is based on certain 
assumptions. Uncertainty can be identified 
by considering the relevance of the 
assumptions to the situation at hand, for 
example, the British Pesticides and 
Advisory Board (PAC) considered that 
2,4,5-Twas 'safe'. However, PAC assumed 
certain conditions that applied to the 
'ideal world' of the laboratory and these 
could not be met when 2,4,5-T was used 
in the 'field'. Analysis of PAC's 
assumptions shows that their risk assessment of 2,4,5-T application contained large 
uncertainties. Thus, decision makers must be aware of the assumptions made by experts. 
3.4 Differentiating between risk and uncertainty 
At the theoretical level the distinction between risk and uncertainty can be clearly made. 
However, in reality, risk and uncertainty become intertwined and the distinction between 
them becomes arbitrary. For example, at what point is there significant disagreement 
between participants in the assessment process? When are the assumptions used by 
experts applicable to a particular situation? In most instances it is not be possible to 
answer these questions absolutely and every decision involves some degree of uncertainty. 
Therefore, all decisions affecting the environment will involve aspects of both risk and 
uncertainty. 
7 
3.5 Types of risk 
This section describes types of risk according to the way in which they are estimated. 
Risk can generally be broken into four categories. 
_ Real risk: determined eventually by future circumstances when they develop fully. 
.. Statistical risk: determined by currently available data, typically measured actuarily. 
_ Predicted risk: predicted analytically from systems models structured from historical 
data. 
_ Perceived risk: seen intuitively by individuals. 
Real risk is a hypothetical concept. Often it cannot be evaluated, because it can only be 
determined at some future time, when an event has either happened or it has not. 
Statistical risk and predicted risk are very closely related. They are often called 
objective or technical estimates of risk. These measures of risk are generally calculated 
using frequencies or probabilities of death, injury or damage that are derived from 
recorded events and calculated populations ('real life' happenings). Simulation models 
can likewise be constructed to produce estimates of risk for situations that cannot be 
measured in nature. Examples of this type of calculation include models of nuclear 
power station explosions and leaks from chemical plants. These types of risk are 
normally expressed in numerical terms, for example an event may happen 'once in every 
20 years'. 
The difference between statistical and predicted risk can be quite subtle. Statistical risk 
tends to be based purely on historical happenings, whereas predicted risk incorporates 
the past information into systems models. The reliability of statistical risk estimates 
depends on similar conditions occurring in the future as have occurred in the past. The 
accuracy of predicted risk relies on modelling precision. 
These types of technical measures can be challenged as being irrelevant in one-off 
situations. For example, the chance of dam failure can be 'objectively' calculated by using 
the number of dams and the number of failures. For a particular dam, however, these 
results may have little relevance. 
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Perceived risk is a judgement or valuation of consequences by individuals or groups of 
people. It is the most 'subjective' measure of risk and is used in many 'qualitative' risk 
assessment approaches. Perceived risk is normally expressed in qualitative terms such as 
'large' or 'small'. 
The distinction is often made between subjective and objective assessments of risk. Yet 
in reality, all assessments of risk involve some subjectivity because they cannot avoid 
containing elements of opinion. For example, technical assessment techniques rely on 
opinion to design experiments, select models, decide what weightings to assign to social 
importance, establish the way in which data are selected or derived, and even to decide 
upon the risks that are chosen to be studied. The concept of an objective risk estimate 
is therefore a misnomer. 
The term 'actual risk' is often used in risk assessment and is also a misnomer. 'Actual 
risk' is usually used to describe scientifically calculated or experienced mortality and as 
such it is equivalent to statistical risk. However, 'technical risk' should not be termed 
actual risk, because technical estimates often contain considerable subjective bias as a 
result of data inadequacies, data selection methods, and the subjective selection of 
assumptions. This guide avoids the use of the term 'actual' risk because it is misleading. 
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4 The risk assessment process 
The aim of risk assessment is to provide information to allow decision makers to make 
informed choices about management options. In the past, environmental risk assessment 
has mainly involved technical experts. However, this tendency is changing and overseas 
experience shows that risk assessment now involves extensive consultation with the wider 
community. While techniques for assessing environmental risk have changed, the basic 
process remains the same. 
This section provides a brief outline of the risk assessment process. Specific risk 
assessment techniques are described in Section B. 
4.1 Elements of risk assessment 
There are three main parts to the risk assessment process (Figure 3). These interact to 
some extent and tend to overlap. They are: 
_ identifying actions and outcomes, 
_ estimating probabilities and magnitudes, 
_ evaluating the risks. 
These three areas are now described. 
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I Identify Actions and Outcomes I 
0 
Estimate Probabilities and 
Outcome Magnitudes 
Evaluate risk in terms of 
society's goals and expectations, 
including notions of sustainability 
< 
Leads to creation of information 
for the decision making process 
Figure 3 Framework for the environmental risk assessment process. 
4.2 Identifying risks 
The first step in the risk assessment process is to identify the risks. Risk identification 
involves considering the causes or origins of the risk (actions), whom or what is at risk 
(outcomes), as well as the conditions under which the hazard occurs. 
Identified outcomes should not be excluded at this stage on the basis that they are 
'insignificant,5. While some sections of the community perceive a risk to be 
'insignificant', others may perceive the risk to be 'significant'. The decision maker must 
remember that all estimates of risk have subjective elements and therefore no risk 
estimates can be given automatic priority over another. 
5 Insignificant may be decided by the decision maker or other participants. 
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There is no single 'right' technique for identifying risk. Techniques are likely to vary 
depending on the situation. A number of different methods may be used, including: 
_ traditional or folk medicine, 
_ commonsense assessment, 
.. analogy to well known cases, 
.. experiments on human subjects, 
.. review of inadvertent and occupational exposure, 
.. epidemiological studies, 
_ experiments on non-human organisms, 
.. test of product, or component performance. 
4.3 Risk estimation 
Once the actions and outcomes have been identified, their relative magnitude and 
probability must be estimated (either quantitatively or qualitatively). This will enable 
their relative importance to be evaluated. Risk estimation involves two aspects, 
estimating the probability and magnitude of outcomes. Thus, a risk estimate is the 
combination of the probability and magnitude estimates. 
Estimating the probability of an outcome can be achieved by various methods. These 
methods are likely to produce different estimates, depending on the assumptions that are 
used. For example, one expert may consider that a pesticide will not cause harm to 
humans as long as it is below a certain concentration, while another expert may consider 
any level of pesticide has a probability of causing harm. Assumptions must be clearly 
defined so that the different participants in the process can appreciate how they each 
arrived at different measures of the probability of an outcome occurring. 
Estimating magnitude of an outcome is often difficult. Often the public and 'experts' 
have different views on the relative importance of a hazard. There are no easy methods 
for aligning different estimates of outcomes and it may be better to consider all outcomes 
as having some importance and use the risk evaluation process to determine magnitudes. 
In many instances technical estimates of risk are used. These are often expressed in 
terms that require extensive interpretation for the lay public (see for example any 
technical risk assessment report). This guide suggests that decision makers ensure that 
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all risk estimates are presented in a form that can be comprehended by all participants 
in the risk assessment process. 
4.4 Risk evaluation 
The risk evaluation process is used to relate risk estimates to society's expectations and 
values. For example, a risk estimate may be small, possibly 'insignificant' in numerical 
terms, but for cultural reasons society may find the risk does not meet its expectations 
and is unacceptable. 
Evaluating risk is a subjective process. Value judgements are required because: 
.. risk estimates themselves contain subjective elements and may vary depending on the 
method used to generate them, 
_ values placed on the estimates will vary depending on the views of the different 
participants, 
_ the physical setting will have a major influence on the value of the risk, 
_ the evaluation process includes analysis of the reliability of risk estimates and their 
applicability to the current situation - also issues that involve subjective assessments. 
It is impossible to 'objectively' choose a particular 'right' value. Decision makers can 
make defensible choices if they use clearly identified sets of principles or criteria to guide 
the evaluation process. 
4.4.1 Acceptable risk 
The evaluation phase of the risk assessment process involves evaluating the level of risk 
that society finds acceptable. This discussion begins by considering what 'acceptable' 
means, and then past, current and emerging methods for establishing an acceptable level 
of risk are discussed. 
Determining an acceptable environmental risk is concerned with safety and includes 
safety of ecological and social values. Something is 'safe' if its risks are judged to be 
acceptable. Setting an acceptable level of risk is a subjective exercise because safety 
concerns values. 
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The acceptability of risk raises three questions: 
_ acceptable in whose view? 
_under what terms is a risk acceptable? 
_ for whom is the risk acceptable? 
Originally, technical experts' views were used to set an acceptable level of risk. Experts 
defined an acceptable risk by comparing quantitative risk estimates to known and 
accepted risks, such as traffic accidents. This approach used three assumptions, all of 
which are now considered faulty. These are: 
_ that quantitative risk estimates are perfectly accurate, whereas often they contain large 
uncertainties, 
_ that society accepts one level of risk for all activities, whereas society prefers to accept 
different levels of risks for different activities, 
_ that death is the only value that is important, when in fact society considers that that 
is many values are important. 
Thus, the technical approach, which relates environmental risk to the risks that society 
accepts in other activities, may not be an appropriate method for establishing an 
'acceptable' environmental risk. 
The limitations of the purely technical approach have led to the adoption of broader 
approaches. These approaches recognise that the level of acceptable risk is likely to vary 
depending on site-specific values that can be impossible to define accurately in absolute, 
quantitative terms. Currently, the setting of an acceptable risk is seen as a process that 
involves members of the community and agencies affected by a decision, both indirectly 
and directly. This approach encourages participation from a wide range of groups, 
including the affected community. 
Very recently, an analogous concept to acceptable risk has been developed. 'Tolerable 
risk' depends on the idea of benefits outweighing risks. A tolerable risk is often 
associated with a specific time period or activity. In many cases people are prepared to 
accept a higher level of risk over a short time than they would accept over a longer 
period, that is, they will tolerate a risk under certain conditions. 
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Another emerging approach to setting an acceptable level of risk uses a 'precautionary 
principle,.6 This approach is being adopted as a management tool in the Great Lakes 
region of North America and in some European countries as a consequence of the major 
environmental problems in these regions. 
The precautionary approach involves the simple precept that: decision makers should 
err on the side of caution. The use of this approach means that a development project 
is assumed to have an unacceptable level of environmental risk (i.e. is unsafe) until it can 
be proved beyond doubt that the project has an acceptable level of environmental risk 
(i.e. is safe). 
4.S The role of the media in risk assessment 
The current process for making risk assessments encourages community participation. 
Yet, to participate effectively, the community needs to be informed about the risks and 
uncertainties to which it is being exposed. In many instances the media will be the 
community's primary source of this information. This is a cause for concern to some 
participants because they feel that the media can be manipulated by interest groups and 
that it has the ability to influence the community's assessment of a risk. However, media 
researchers disagree and believe that the community is quite discerning in its assimilation 
of media reports. 
A further concern is that the media may have difficulty communicating technical 
information, which is often complicated and loaded with jargon. Media involvement in 
risk issues does require experts to present their findings in a way that both the community 
and the media can understand. 
4.6 The role of the technical expert 
Technical experts are often asked to provide 'facts'. These 'facts' can have a crucial 
influence on the assessment process and experts can play a significant role in the risk 
assessment process. 
6 This technique is outlined further in Section B. 
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At times experts have experienced difficulties in providing relevant information that the 
other participants in the risk assessment process find credible. In many instances this 
situation has arisen because of differences between the environment in which the expert 
works and the risk assessment process (Rip, 1985). 
The expert's environment is very structured and has a clearly defined 'set of rules' that 
guide conduct and methods for presenting information. 'Facts' result from this structured 
environment with uncertainties being eliminated through the use of controlled 
experiments. In comparison, the risk assessment process, which often becomes political, 
may not be very structured in that various groups are involved and clearly defined rules 
are not agreed upon. 'Facts' may not exist due to the uncertainty associated with natural 
systems, and the different values that are held by the various groups towards the 
environment. 
To provide relevant and credible information experts must become aware of the nature 
of public processes. Furthermore, they must openly acknowledge that the information 
they can contribute has limitations and is subject to uncertainty. 
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Section B Description of risk assessment techniques and approaches 
5 Quantitative and qualitative risk assessment 
Approaches to risk assessment can be divided into two broad categories: quantitative and 
qualitative. Quantitative techniques are used in an attempt to define risks objectively. 
Qualitative techniques are used as part of a more subjective approach in which value 
judgements are acknowledged as an integral part of the risk assessment process. In 
reality, both techniques contain subjective elements, because quantitative risk estimates 
are based on the subjective selection of certain assumptions. 
"... quantitative risk estimates are based on 
the subjective selection of certain 
assumptions. II ( cartoon adapted from 
International Joint Commission, 1978). 
In this guide, quantitative techniques are 
recognised as providing subjective 
information and are defined as techniques 
that have a heavy reliance on numerical 
analysis. Qualitative approaches include all 
other techniques. 
The aIm of this section is to provide a 
description of commonly used quantitative 
and qualitative risk assessment approaches 
and techniques. 
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6 Quantitative (technical) risk assessment 
The technical approach to risk assessment usually involves scientists and engineers, often 
from many different disciplines. For example, a technical assessment of the risk 
associated with a chemical plant would involve engineering analysis of the chance of a 
hazard occurring and also biological analysis to determine the potential harmful effects. 
Uncertainties abound in technical risk assessments. These can be categorised as: 
.. completeness uncertainties - due to the analyst'S inability to conceive of all possible 
scenarios, such as the errors made by the personnel operating a plant, 
... modelling uncertainties - due to wrong assumptions or wrong equations being used to 
model scenarios, 
.. data uncertainties - due to uncertainties and errors in data used in the models. 
Thus, technical assessments may not provide accurate risk estimates. 
Quantitative assessments have been divided into clearly defined techniques (Vesely, 
1984). These are: 
_ statistical analysis of past events having similar consequences, 
_ extrapolation techniques of past occurrences of less severe events, 
.. event tree analysis, 
_ fault tree analysis. 
6.1 Statistical analysis of past events 
Statistical analysis of past events is used when an event has occurred before and has 
resulted in a hazard at least as large as the one of current concern. The technique 
involves estimating the frequency? of a risk-causing event, by taking the number of 
outcomes in some 'exposure' time period. The exposure time takes into account the 
number of units or individuals that were exposed to the possible outcome during the time 
? Quantitative techniques provide either a frequency or probability estimate. Technical experts 
distinguish between these two, but both can be used to provide an estimate of the 'chance' of an 
event. 
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period. For example, the frequency of death from a particular hazard could be calculated 
by dividing the number of deaths by the total amount of time that people were exposed 
to the potential hazard. 
Decision makers must be aware of three points when using frequency information 
provided by statistical analysis. 
... Statistics need to be put into the context of the time and the place of the situation 
under consideration. For example, an accident at a chemical plant sited in a sparsely 
populated area may have affected very few people but this does not imply that a 
similar occurrence in a residential suburb would affect only a few people. 
... The frequency derived by this method is the 'average' frequency, which may have little 
relevance to the particular case being considered. For example, the frequency of a 
component failure at a chemical plant could be calculated by analysing the past 
performance of all identical components, yet the frequency could vary as the plant 
becomes old, or when the plant begins operations and construction faults cause 
component failure. 
_ The accuracy of the risk estimate depends on the reliability and completeness of the 
data on past events. 
Further analysis of the frequency indices can be used to produce frequency versus 
consequence graphs. From these graphs return periods for certain hazardous events can 
be calculated. Return periods are usually described in terms of expecting one event in 
a certain time period, such as a one in IO-year event. The return period information can 
be used to identify a level of risk that is acceptable, or at least a level of risk that decision 
makers should aim not to exceed. 
Statistical analysis of past events is commonly used in situations where there is a well 
established data base for a particular event, such as the chance of an industrial 
component failing when similar components have been in use in many situations for a 
number of years. When there is a lack of established data extrapolation is used. 
19 
6.2 Extrapolation techniques 
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Figure 4: Extrapolation of flood frequency data. The data 
used to generate curves Band C are slightly altered (shown 
as crosses) which changes the extrapolations (adapted 
from Klem(;!s, 1986). 
Extrapolation techniques 
are a variation on statistical 
analysis of past events. 
They are used where there 
are past data on events of 
lesser consequence but 
there are no data on 
'extreme' events. The 
probability of an extreme 
event is estimated by 
extrapolating from the 
probabilities of less extreme 
events. 
The frequency derived using extrapolation techniques may not be reliable for two reasons. 
_ Extrapolation techniques rely on the principle that extreme events are caused by the 
same physical mechanisms and processes as less severe events. However, extreme 
events may have different causes from normal events. 
.. Small errors in the data can result in large errors in the extrapolated frequency 
(Figure 4). 
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Extrapolation techniques have been used extensively to assess risks from 'natural' events 
such as flooding and high winds. At times these techniques have also been used to 
establish the probability of failures in the components used in industrial plants. Because 
this technique is used often and affects planning, for example the positioning of 
hazardous waste stores in relation to the hazard from flooding, decision makers need to 
be aware of its shortcomings. 
6.3 Event tree analysis 
Event tree analysis is used when a hazardous occurrence has many possible causes. This 
type of analysis is used when there are no previous cases of a hazardous occurrence and 
it is not possible to extrapolate from 'small-magnitude' events to 'large-magnitude' events. 
The technique involves systematically analysing all possible failures that could combine 
in a sequence to create a hazardous occurrence. These sequences of events are arranged 
by the analyst into a logical 'tree' structure with each branch describing a basic event 
(Figure 5). The final result is a frequency based on the principle that a combination of 
individual events must happen in sequence to trigger a hazardous situation. 
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Figure 5: Event tree for a hypothetical nuclear plant (adapted from Vesely, 1984). 
Event tree analysis is commonly applied in engineering situations. It is particularly 
relevant when analysing the frequency of a catastrophe occurring from failures in complex 
technical structures such as petrochemical plants. 
The reliability of a frequency derived using event tree analysis depends on the accuracy 
of two separate assessments. Firstly, all sequences of events that lead to a catastrophe 
must be correctly identified. Secondly, the chance of an individual event happening must 
be accurate. In reality, these conditions may not be met and event tree analysis will not 
always provide an accurate estimate of the chance of an outcome happening. 
While the frequency estimate may not be particularly meaningful to decision makers (due 
to uncertainty), event tree analysis is very useful to others, particularly engineers and 
industrial managers. The technique can be used to identify single events that have a 
comparatively high chance of occurring and steps can be taken to reduce the chance of 
these events happening. 
6.4 Fault tree analysis 
Fault tree analysis is similar in style to event tree analysis. It is used to provide a 
probability of a hazard occurring and is commonly used in industrial situations_ However, 
it differs from event tree analysis in that it starts by considering an undesired event, then 
traces back the different causes that can lead to the event. Event tree analysis, on the 
other hand, works through causes towards an event. 
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Like event tree analysis, fault tree analysis uses certain assumptions that may not always 
be reliable. This means that the accuracy of the probability is questionable. 
The results from both event and fault tree analysis can be applied in two ways. Firstly, 
the numerical probability may be used as a criteria to allow a project to proceed, 
however, we do not recommend this approach because the probability may not be 
accurate. Secondly, the relative likelihood of the cause of an event can be determined. 
Comparing probabilities is the useful feature of these two approaches because high 
probability causes of failure can be targeted and the chances of a hazard occurring can 
be reduced. Thus, the strength in these related techniques lies in providing comparative 
rather than absolute risk estimates. 
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7 Qualitative risk assessment 
Compared to quantitative techniques, qualitative approaches can allow for a greater 
range of risks to be included in the risk assessment process. Qualitative approaches are 
likely to be used extensively if the community becomes involved in the decision-making 
process because communities often place values on the environment that are difficult to 
quantify. Qualitative techniques have only recently become widely used by risk analysts 
and decision makers; new techniques are still being developed and older techniques are 
still being refined. Therefore, this section tends to describe general approaches rather 
than specific te~hniques. 
There are four main types of qualitative risk assessment approach: 
.. the decision-analytic technique, which extends technical assessment into an area of 
acknowledged (by technical experts) subjectivity, 
om the risk-perception approach, which identifies the perceptions of risk that various 
groups have, 
... the precautionary approach, which promotes caution, and 
.. the policy-analytic approach, which can be used to devise a framework that 
incorporates all risk assessment techniques. 
7.1 The decisionaanalytic (weighted) assessmentS 
The decision-analytic technique lies inbetween the purely quantitative and qualitative 
approaches. This technique can incorporate a wide range of assessments, not just 
quantitative. It makes explicit acknowledgement and use of value judgements. 
This technique uses the process of ranking to determine the importance of different risks. 
'Significant' outcomes or probabilities can be given increased 'weighting' by changing their 
position in the list of rankings. Magnitudes and probabilities do not need to be 
determined quantitatively: they can be assessed in the terms 'large' or 'small'. Risk 
assessment information is provided as a list of risks that are ranked according to their 
severity. 
8 This type of technique was used when assessing risks in the Rosebank Peninsula Area, Auckland, 
which is described in Section 8.1 of this publication. 
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In many cases, outcomes and probabilities are ranked separately and a scoring system is 
used to combine these into a 'risk', in the form of a 'score'. Scoring methods can be 
developed to meet the specific nature of a situation and can be complex. Scoring systems 
are flexible and adaptive. 
Outcomes are ranked according to the effects they have on the environment. Different 
ranking methods can be devised for different situations. In situations where certain 
features within the environment have different values, for example a protected natural 
area as one feature and exotic forest as another, the effects of outcomes on each feature 
can be qualitatively assessed and a list of ranked outcomes is made for each 
environmental feature. Many groups can be involved in ranking and selecting the 
important features including experts and members of the community. 
The probabilities of outcomes happening are similarly ranked. Quantitative and 
qualitative information about probabilities can be combined. For example, human error 
might be included in a quantitative estimate of probability by moving that probability 
higher up the list of ranked probabilities. 
Renn (1985) outlines the following characteristics of the decision-analytic technique: 
.. it regards risk as a subjective mental construction (i.e. perception) about specific 
outcomes, events or actions, 
.. the context in which the decision is made is considered to be of primary importance; 
thus decision makers rather than technical experts can decide what is important to a 
particular situation (context), 
.. probabilities and preferences are deliberately derived from subjective judgements, 
intuition, speculation and other sources of knowledge, as well as from technical 
analysis, 
.. it is useful for establishing favoured options (because it ranks options), however the 
options analysed must relate to the same problem, 
... the benefits and costs (utility) of each option to the participants is regarded as 
important, so attitudes that help or hinder this utility can be incorporated into the 
analysis, for example an individual participant's aversion or proneness to taking risk, 
... many dimensions of the risk problem can be included, for example risks to spiritual 
values, 
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.. the problem of human interaction with the source of risk, for example whether or not 
people will take notice of warning signs or information leaflets, and the subjective 
probability of human failure can be more readily addressed than in technical analyses~ 
and 
.. the nature of the analysis can vary from situation to situation, for example, different 
methods might be used to assess the values that are important to different types of 
community, such as rural or urban. 
The decision-analytic assessment technique has advantages for the decision maker 
compared with quantitative techniques. It can take account of the subjective nature of 
risk. This technique can allow the sectors of society affected by the risk to have an input 
into the assessment process. It can legitimise policies in the face of criticism, because no 
single type of analysis (e.g. technical) is used as the sale criterion for a decision. In effect 
this technique broadens the information base upon which a decision is made. 
This technique also has disadvantages. It does not always make allowance for the 
influence that technical analysts have on the decision-making process. This influence can 
occur in a number of ways, for example a technical expert may present a convincing 
analysis but may neglect to mention inherent uncertainties that would weaken the 
analysis. Furthermore, there is an assumption in the decision-analytic technique that 
decision makers are only interested in making rational decisions, whereas often decisions 
have political implications; decisions made may hence seem irrational to some. The 
decision-analytic technique may not focus on these types of issues yet they can have a 
large influence on the final decision. 
7.2 Risk perception 
This approach is based on assessing the criteria that are important to those who are 
exposed to the risk. It recognises that different groups have different appreciations of 
risk. 
Gough (1990) identifies four methods for determining perception of risk: 
.. revealed preferences, 
... expressed preferences, 
... implied preferences, 
... natural standards. 
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The revealed preference method is based on the assumption that by trial and error society 
has arrived at a nearly optimal balance between the risks and benefits associated with an 
activity. However, society may not operate currently at an optimal level of risk. ' Past 
decisions might have been the result of poor public policy making, indifference from the 
community, lack of information, or 'old' values that have changed. New evidence may 
come to light that alters risk assessments, for example agricultural chemicals that were 
once thought to have acceptable risks have been banned due to unforeseen outcomes, 
such as the accumulation of toxic residues. 
Thus, the revealed preference method has many flaws: 
_ it does not allow for changing societal values, 
_ the method assumes that people have full information and use it optimally, 
_ it assumes that decisions in the market place are 'right', and 
... the method ignores important questions about equity and the access that groups have 
to the decision-making process. 
The main advantage of this approach is financial. Existing data can be used to gain some 
idea of the risks that society currently accepts, negating other costly and difficult methods 
of assessing the level of risk that society is willing to accept, such as the methods 
discussed below. 
The expressed preference approach takes the view that it is meaningless to compare risks 
in different activities, as technical experts have tended to do in the past. A level of risk 
that is acceptable needs to be determined for each and every situation involving risk, 
because society perceives different risks in different ways. This approach assumes that 
there is no one single level of acceptable risk that can be applied to all situations. 
The expressed preference approach can be used to establish values that are violated. 
Quantitative (technical) techniques do not accommodate societal values readily (other 
than death) nor does the decision-analytic technique (but to a lesser degree). Evidence 
from both overseas and New Zealand suggests that values are important in a community's 
assessment of risk, and that values can influence the identification of an acceptable risk. 
There are problems with the application of the expressed preference approach. Firstly, 
the approach assumes that many people have the same perception of risk, which means 
there are difficulties dealing with large variations in risk perception within sample groups. 
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Secondly, to canvass public opinion, innovative survey techniques are required, which can 
be difficult to implement and costly. 
The implied preference method determines society's preferences by considering all 
aspects of the institutions that have been set up to deal with risk issues in the past. For 
example, Court or Planning Tribunal decisions are often used in New Zealand as 
precedents and these may be interpreted as levels of risk that society is prepared to 
accept for certain activities. Proponents of this method consider that the decisions made 
in the past do not represent the optimum situation, but regard the attempts as the best 
to date. 
Unfortunately, institutions and their associated activities are not entirely consistent and 
are continually changing. For example, all levels of government in New Zealand have 
been restructured and agencies responsible for assessing certain risks have been abolished 
or had their operating structure changed. The implied preference method, therefore, can 
result in time-consuming and tortuous interpretation of information. 
The natural standards approach takes the view that nature provides the best indication 
about environmental risk. It assumes that whatever the environment has tolerated in the 
past is tolerable in the future, and provided that human activities do not alter natural 
systems too much, the environment is not subject to excessive risk. The simplicity and 
logic of this approach make it seem like an appealing method for assessing environmental 
risk. However, it does have a major problem. This approach is open to the subjective 
selection of particular versions of reality i.e. perceptions play an important role in this 
approach. For example, technical experts may argue that a certain chemical poses no 
hazard because it has always been present in the environment, while other people may 
argue that the concentrations of the chemical are in excess of 'natural' levels and that this 
could pose a significant hazard. 
Perceptions of risk vary from situation to situation, group to group and individual to 
individual, and can depend on the method used to elicit the information. However, some . 
consistent points concerning people's perceptions of risk have emerged that decision 
makers can be aware of (Renn, 1985): 
_ people react differently to unfamiliar and familiar risks, 
_ people are happier to accept risks over which they feel they have some control, 
compared with those that they believe they have no control over, 
.. wh,ether or not the risk is perceived as being a 'sensible' risk is often important, 
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.. how 'dreaded' a risk is will often affect people's perceptions, 
.. the extent to which the hazard will cause harm, both to life and values, is important 
to people, even when the chance of the hazard occurring is small, 
.. how well people can imagine the cause of an accident will affect their perception, and 
.. the impact of the need to enforce excessively strict and far-reaching precautions and 
regulations will affect people's attitude to risk. 
7.3 The precautionary approach9 
The precautionary approach gives the benefit of the doubt to the environment. While 
this may appear to be a simple and reasonable criteria against which to evaluate risk, its 
application can cause problems. The major difficulty lies in determining when and where 
uncertainties and risks lie in a decision. For example, technical experts may state with 
some certainty that a substance will be harmless when released into the environment, but 
some years later new evidence may come to light that shows the substance to be unsafe. 
The precautionary approach is very new and has been used in only a few applications. 
It appears to provide useful information about situations where damage to the 
environment may not become apparent for many years after an event has happened, or 
when uncertainties are large. For example, the International Joint Commission1o (IJC) 
have adopted an anticipatory approach as a policy. As an anticipatory action, the IJC is 
now considering banning the use of all chemicals containing organo-chlorines in the 
catchments of the Great Lakes due to the length of time these chemicals remain active 
in the ecosystems and the potential these chemicals have to cause health problems to 
many different species including humans. Because of lack of experience with this 
approach the techniques for its implementation in New Zealand need to be considered 
and developed. 
9 Also known as the anticipatory or preventative approach. 
10 The IJC has responsibility for managing the water resources of the Great Lakes in North America. 
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7.4 The policy-analytic approach 
The policy-analytic approach is a tool that can be used by decision makers to synthesise 
all risk assessments into one framework. It can be used to subjectively, but defensibly, 
determine the type of assessment that will carry most weight. 
The policy-analytic approach to risk assessment emphasises process rather than outcome. 
It focuses on the social and political process of decision making and can be used to 
determine the effects of various influences on the risk assessments, such as institutional 
constraints, communication interactions, power interplays, and the distribution of power 
among the participating groups. On the basis of information provided by policy analysis, 
the risk assessment process can be changed to meet specific criteria, such as the need to 
increase the input from specific participants, or the need to hasten a decision. 
The strength of the policy-analytic approach is that it explores the social and political 
environment in which a decision takes place. Environmental risk decisions tend to 
become socially and politically oriented and the policy-analytic approach can 'enlighten' 
decision makers as to how an overall assessment of a risk was really made, and how this 
information was actually used. For example, policy analysis may provide insights into 
how risk assessments associated with the Clyde Dam were made, and how the resulting 
information was handled. 
On the basis of the insights gained by policy analysis decision makers can change the 
nature of risk assessment processes. For example an assessment process can be altered 
to allow for increased input from disadvantaged participants. 
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8 Situations involving environmental risk assessment in New Zealand 
This section provides some examples of situations involving environmental risk assessment 
in New Zealand. It outlines the approaches and types of information that have been 
used by decision makers. The aim of this section is to relate the theory in the preceding 
sections to real situations. 
While the examples given in this section generally concern large industrial projects, it 
should be remembered that small scale developments and activities can also pose a 
significant risk to the environment. Both the individual effects and the cumulative effects 
of small scale projects need to be assessed for the risk they pose; for example the 
combined effects of land clearance, wetland drainage and contaminated runoff may 
subject a stream ecosystem to risk, but this does not normally occur. Usually it is only 
the 'big' projects that are assessed for environmental risk. 
8.1 Rosebank Peninsula, AuckIandll 
The Rosebank Peninsula is located in Western Auckland and lies in the southern part of 
the Waitemata Harbour. It is approximately four kilometres long, is zoned industrial and 
is the site of heavy industries, many of which use hazardous substances. 
In 1988, the Auckland City Council commissioned a risk assessment study of the area, in 
response to a number of hazardous incidents that had occurred in recent years. There 
was public concern that neighbouring environments (including residential areas) were 
being subjected to excessive risk. 
The initial stages of the study took a qualitative approach along the lines of the decision-
analytic technique. Subsequently, detailed quantitative risk assessments were carried out 
on the risks that were ranked highly. 
11 See Geological Consultants of New Zealand (1989) in suggested reading list. 
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In the qualitative assessment phase, the environment was broken into three features or 
'categories': 
_ the living environment (e.g. Waitemata Harbour), 
_ property (e.g. housing, industrial premises), 
_ people (e.g. worker, members of the neighbouring residential community). 
For each environmental category the effects of potential outcomes were divided into 
different groups. The risks were assessed (Figure 6) by experts who were familiar with 
industrial premises. The experts used a 'commonsense' approach (i.e. their perception) 
to estimate levels of risk in qualitative terms. In a similarly qualitative manner the 
experts assessed the relative contributions that different activities made to the risks in an 
environmental category (Figure 7). 
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environmental categories to risk (Source, . 
Geological Consultants of New Zealand, 
1989). 
Experts made quantitative assessments of the risks that were ranked as being 'large'. The 
quantitative risk assessments were made mainly on the basis of statistical analysis of past 
events. Risk assessments of specific scenarios, such as fires and the associated hazard 
32 
posed to the environment by contaminated firewater, were made on a 'what if basis 
similar in style to a combination of event and fault tree analysis. 
Experts determined acceptable quantitative risk levels using a variety of methods, 
including subjectively selecting an "appropriate benchmark" and choosing objectives like 
" ... the houses along the main roads on the Peninsula should not have their risk of fire 
significantly increased by transport of hazardous goods.,,12 
Throughout this study assessments were made by experts. There was very little input 
from the neighbouring residential community. Many of the assessments, including the 
acceptability of risks, were based on experts' perceptions. 
On the basis of the information provided by the risk assessment a rationale for reducing 
risk was developed. Recommendations were aimed at management of industry, statutory 
authorities and emergency services. 
8.2 Western reclamation petrochemical storage area, Auckland13 
The Western Reclamation Area is close to 'downtown' Auckland. It extends into the 
Waitemata Harbour and is used to store petrochemicals. The area was the landing point 
for petrol supplies to the Auckland area but, with the construction of a pipeline between 
Auckland and Marsden Point, the amount of petrol being shipped has reduced. 
A risk assessment study was commissioned by the Auckland City Council, Harbour Board 
and Regional Authority in 1988. These agencies recognised that handling-facilities in the 
area were changing (due to pipeline construction) as were the social and environmental 
conditions including social expectations. Furthermore, it was recognised that an 
increasing range of potentially hazardous chemicals were being landed. With all these 
changes, the three agencies agreed that it was necessary to improve management 
techniques in order to attempt to reduce the risk or hazard. This primarily involved 
assessing the risks. 
The approach taken to the risk assessment study was mainly quantitative and 
predominantly used fault tree analysis. The study looked at single and cumulative events 
12 Quotations taken from the 'Rosebank Peninsula risk assessment study'. 
13 See New South Wales Department of Planning (1989) in suggested reading list. 
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The approach taken to the risk assessment study was mainly quantitative and 
predominantly used fault tree analysis. The study looked at single and cumulative events 
and considered a wide range of issues, including safety standards. Some of the analysis 
was very detailed, for example the performance of individual fuel control valves was 
analysed. 
The risk assessment was carried out by technical experts with little input from 'the public'. 
The assessment acknowledged that purely probabilistic (quantitative) approaches were 
generally of limited value to the decision-making process, thus the assessment 
incorporated some qualitative aspects with the quantitative analysis. For example: 
... the process of identifying hazards was undertaken by on-site auditing and surveys that 
assessed activities like the operation of safety equipment i.e. the assessment contained 
value judgements made by experts, 
... ranking systems were used to determine the most severe incidents, 
.. the assessment study recognised that the public is concerned with potential hazards 
regardless of the probability of the hazard occurring. 
The result of the assessment was a quantitative, contoured 'risk map' (Figure 8), which 
can provide information for planning further development near the installation. Methods 
for reducing risk were also suggested. 
8.3 Oil drilling application, Sugarloaf Islands Marine Park, Taranaki14 
During 1989, the oil exploration consortium 'TCPL Resources Limited' sought rights to 
drill for oil in the Sugar Loaf Islands Marine Park. Some sections of the community 
became concerned that a major drilling accident would have disastrous consequences for 
a regional 'taonga', and the issue quickly became one of risk. In the community's mind, 
the negative consequences of an accident were very important considerations, even if the 
probability of occurrence was small. 
The exploration consortium released an initial report outlining the proposed drilling 
programme. This report calledfor submissions and a second report that addressed issues 
raised in the submissions was released. Neither report contained a comprehensive 
environmental risk assessment of the proposal. 
14 The information in this section has been obtained from newspaper articles, reports commissioned 
by TCPL Resources Limited, and communication with agencies involved in the consent process. 
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Figure 8 Risk map for the Western Reclamation Area. The risk contours are in 
units of millions/per person per year (Source, New South Wales Department of 
Planning, 1989). 
The release of the second report did little to reduce the community's unease about the 
proposal. The New Plymouth City Council considered that some matters of concern were 
such that the drilling programme should not proceed unless ways of overcoming these 
matters could be achieved. Community groups continued to oppose the proposal and a 
protest march was held in New Plymouth which attracted around 200 people. 
The drilling application required consents under many different pieces of legislation. The 
statutory process did not clearly define whether environmental risk could be raised as a 
valid objection. Consequently, there was debate at the time as to how environmental risk 
should be addressed. 
At the time of writing this guide, the issues associated with the drilling application had 
not been resolved. 
35 
8.4 Herbicide use in the Kaeo area, Northland15 
In the Kaeo area, Northland, agriculture was the predominant landuse. The area had a 
thistle/gorse problem and farmers often used hormonal sprays such as 2,4,5,-T and 2,4-D 
as a means of control. In the 1970s and 1980s, horticulture developed in the region and 
horticulturalists perceived a significant risk to their crops from the agricultural sprays. 
Horticulturalists brought the issue to the attention of the farmers. The farming 
community was generally willing to acknowledge the risks and a meeting was held 
between the two groups over morning tea. An informal assessment of risk was made by 
those involved in the issue and both the farmers' and horticulturalists' perceptions of risk 
were given validity. The only 'technical expert' present was a noxious plants officer who 
gave an outline of the sprays to use, when to apply them, and generally steered the 
gathering. The meeting led to an assessment of the risks that both groups accepted. On 
the basis of the assessment, a workable and practical management strategy for 
agricultural spray application was agreed upon and implemented. 
This very informal method of assessing risk, which involved lay-person's perceptions, is 
currently being used as a basis for managing risks from agricultural sprays in the grape-
growing area around Martinborough, Wairarapa. 
15 The information in this section has been obtained through personal communication with D. 
Gibbs, formerly of Kaeo, now farming near Martinborough. 
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9 Summary 
Four points emerge in assessing risk. 
_ All assessments of risk contain subjective elements, including technical assessments. 
_ There is no single level of risk that society finds acceptable. The risks that society is 
prepared to accept or tolerate will vary from situation to situation. 
_ The community needs to be involved in making an assessment because it is the 
community that is most affected by a risk. Therefore, environmental risk assessment 
involves community participation as well as expert participation. Because members of 
the community need to be informed, risk information must be readily accessible and 
presented in a way that lay-people can understand. 
_ There is no single 'correct' way of assessing environmental risk. While there is a 
general process that can be followed, specific techniques used within the process will 
vary depending on the situation. Risk assessments will often require the use of many 
different approaches and techniques. 
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Figure 9 illustrates the process of assessing environmental risk. It expands upon the basic 
risk assessment process illustrated in Figure 4. 
9.1 Suggestions for selecting risk assessment techniques and approaches 
Many risk assessments use a mixture of qualitative and quantitative approaches. The use 
of certain techniques or approaches depends on the situation surrounding a particular 
assessment. Some points to help readers select specific risk assessment techniques and 
approaches are now outlined. 
Quantitative (technical) techniques are of most use when the issues are clearly defined 
and are agreed to by all participants, with the caveat that affected groups have fair access 
to the decision-making process. 
The following are criteria for selecting specific quantitative assessment techniques. 
Statistical analysis of past events can be used when a long period of record is 
available on identical situations involving risk, for example the rate of failure of a 
particular component in an industrial plant. 
_ Extrapolation may be used when a comparatively 'short' period of record exists but 
'extreme' events have not occurred. To provide accurate information the extreme 
event must be caused by the same physical processes and mechanisms as less severe 
events. This technique is often used to provide information about 'natural' hazards 
such as flooding. 
_ Event and fault trees are used to determine risks in complex technical structures when 
a combination of events must occur in sequence to produce a hazard, for example in 
industrial plants. These techniques are useful for determining the relative probability 
of failure between different components in an industrial plant but may not provide an 
accurate assessment of the chance of a hazardous occurrence because the probabilities 
provided by these techniques do not normally take into consideration 'unusual' causes 
such as human error. 
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Qualitative approaches are most useful when issues are not clearly defined, or 
participants cannot agree on what the issues are when there is limited quantitative data 
available, or when specific values that are important to a community are threatened. 
The following provides a summary of when particular qualitative approaches and 
techniques are most useful. 
_ Decision-analytic technique: Most useful in situations where technical and social 
factors must be combined and a range of options are being considered. 
.. Revealed preference: Has many problems and should be used with extreme care. 
_ Expressed preference: Useful when values that are important to a community may be 
compromised by a risk. 
_ Implied preference: When case histories exist and are relevant to the situation under 
consideration, this approach can be used . 
.. Natural standards: Is useful when the concentration of substances or processes in the 
environment might change as a result of an action. 
_ Precautionary approach: Useful when a hazard may be realised many years after an 
event has happened, or when uncertainties are large, or any situation where prevention 
is better than the cure. This approach may be useful for assessing risks from human 
activities such as groundwater contamination or the use of pesticides that produce toxic 
residues. 
.. Policy-analytic approach: Is a tool that a decision maker can use to provide himself 
or herself with 'insight' into the risk assessment process. For example this tool may 
be used to analyse the level of input that various groups have to the assessment 
process, allowing the decision maker to take into consideration the different skills and 
ability that the participants have. 
Many qualitative approaches make use of input from groups within the community. 
Techniques to allow community participation in the assessment process vary depending 
on the nature of a community. For example a decision maker could enable a community . 
to express their preferences by meeting community leaders, or randomly surveying 
members of a community. Techniques for involving communities in decision-inaking 
processes are being developed in an ongoing research programme at the Centre for 
Resource Management. 
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Suggested further reading 
This section combines both a reference list and a bibliography of useful readings. A. brief 
description of each item of reading material is provided to help the reader select 
literature that suits their needs. 
British Medical Association, 1987. Living with risk. Wiley Press. [A clear descriptive 
outline of the history, nature, measurement and types of risk. Easy reading.] 
Conrad, J. (Ed.) 1980. Society, technology and risk assessment. 
conference held at Frankfurt. Academic Press. [A detailed book. 
length the various risk assessment techniques. A key text.] 
Proceedings of 
Considers at some 
Conservation Foundation, 1987. Risk communication. Proceedings of Conference on 
Risk Communication held in Washington DC, January, 1986. Davies, J.C, Covello, V.T., 
and Allen, F.W. (Eds) Conservation Foundation. [Represents the 'coming of age' of risk 
communication. The information is clearly presented and this text provides useful 
background reading about risk issues that involve public participation.] Copies available 
from: The Conservation Foundation, 1250 Twenty-fourth Street, NW, Washington, DC 
20037. 
Department of Planning, Sydney, 1989. Environmental risk impact assessment guidelines. 
Hazardous Industry Planning Advisory Paper No.3. [This document provides guidelines 
on hazard analysis and risk assessment. It takes an integrated approach to safety planning 
and looks at the wider context of siting hazardous industries and building safety controls into 
their design. This paper is specifically oriented to risks associated with industrial complexes.] 
Copies available from: The Information Branch, Department of Planning, Ground Floor, 
175 Liverpool Street, Sydney NSW 2000. 
Department of Planning, Sydney, 1990. Risk criteria for land use safety planning. 
Hazardous Industry Planning Advisory Paper No.4. [This paper provides guidelines which 
local councils, development proponents and the community can use when assessing risk from 
industrial development.] Copies available from: The Information Branch, Department 
of Planning, Ground Floor, 175 Liverpool Street, Sydney NSW 200 
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Douglas, M. and Wildavsky, A. 1982. Risk and culture. University of California Press. 
[An essay on the selection of technical and environmental dangers. Descriptively written and 
very readable. Analyses the effect of the 'cultural context' on risk issues.] 
Fischoff, B., Lichtenstein, S., Slovic, P., Derby, S.L. and Keeney, R.L. 1981. Acceptable 
risk Cambridge University Press. [Examines approaches to acceptable risk. Aimed at a 
wide-ranging audience. Readers are not expected to have mathematical or technical 
knowledge.] 
Geological Consultants of New Zealand, 1989. Rosebank Peninsula risk assessment study. 
Commissioned by the Auckland City Council. [A study of the environmental risks posed 
by an industrial area in Auckland.] 
Gough, J.D. 1988. Risk and uncertainty. Information Paper No. 10. Centre for 
Resource Management, Lincoln College, Canterbury. [This publication provides an 
overview of the risk literature, concentrating on general approaches to risk analysis and risk 
assessment. ] 
Gough, J.D. 1989. A strategic approach to the use of environmental impact assessment 
and risk assessment within the decision-making process. Information Paper No. 13. 
Centre for Resource Management, Lincoln College. [Consideration is given to the need 
for environmental impact assessment and risk assessment procedures. A generalised 
approach is suggested for dealing with public and private proposals where consent, and 
therefore assessment, procedures are required. This report does not outline specific 
approaches.] 
Gough, J.D. 1990. A review of the literature pertammg to "perceived" risk and 
"acceptable" risk, and methods used to estimate them. Information Paper No. 14. Centre 
for Resource Management, Lincoln University, Canterbury. 
Hertz, D.B. and Thomas, H. 1983. Risk analysis and its application. Wiley Press. [Deals 
with many aspects of risk assessment. Has a strong emphasis on the financial and economic 
approaches to dealing with risk issues.] 
International Joint Commission, 1978. The ecosystem approach. Published by the Great 
Lakes Science Advisory Board, Ontario. [Seeks to combine social and environmental 
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Fisheries, Great Lakes Laboratory for Fisheries and Aquatic Sciences, Canada Centre for 
Inland Waters, PO Box 5050, Burlington, Ontario, Canada L7R 4A6. 
Klemes, V. 1986. Dilettantism in hydrology: transition or destiny. Water resources 
Research 9: 22. pp.177S-188S. [This paper explores the 'unsatisfactory state of 
hydrology', including problems in the area of flood frequency analysis and the techniques 
used (e.g. extrapolation).] 
Mazur, A. 1981. The dynamics of technical controversy. Communications Press. 
[Provides general principles on dealing with technical controversies, and considers the types 
of data required to advance the understanding of issues. Discussion is almost entirely limited 
to affairs in the United States, but has some application to New Zealand situations.] 
Copies: Communications Press Inc., 1346 Connecticut Avenue, NW, 
Washington DC, 20036 
New South Wales Department of Planning, 1989. Western reclamation area risk 
assessment study, Auckland, New Zealand. [An assessment of the risks associated with 
petro-chemical storage facilities situated in close proximity to downtown Auckland. Report 
commissioned jointly for Auckland City Council, Auckland Harbour Board and Auckland 
Regional Authority.] 
Rip, A. 1985. Experts in public arenas. In: Otway, H. and Peltu, M. (Eds) Regulating 
industrial risks. Butterworths Press (printed at the Cambridge University Press). [This 
chapter examines myths about scientific expertise and suggests a more realistic approach to 
the practice of giving and receiving expert advice. The entire book provides useful 
information, especially a chapter by Ortwin Renn, titled "Risk analysis: scope and 
limitations. ] 
The Royal Society, 1983. Risk assessment. Report of the Royal Society Study Group. 
[Provides a practical and useful description of all aspects of environmental risk assessment. 
A comprehensive document.] Copies available from: The Royal Society, 6 Carlton House 
Terrace, London, SWI Y. 5AG 
Vallentine, J.R. (undated). The case for phasing out organohalogens. Palter, J. (Ed.). 
[Examines the rationale behind a particular anticipatory action.] Copies from: 
Greenpeace, 185 Spadina Ave, Suite 600, Toronto, Ontario, Canada. M5T 2C6 
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Vallentine, J.R. (undated). The case for phasing out organohalogens. Palter, J. (Ed.). 
[Examines the rationale behind a particular anticipatory action.] Copies from: 
Greenpeace, 185 Spadina Ave, Suite 600, Toronto, Ontario, Canada. M5T 2C6 
Vallentine, J.R. and Hamilton, A.L. 1987. Managing human uses and abuses of aquatic 
resources in the Canadian ecosystem. In: Healy, M.e. and Wallace, R.R. (Eds) 
Canadian Aquatic Resources. Canadian Bulletin of Fisheries and Aquatic Sciences, 
No. 215. Outlines anticipatory approaches in a clear way. Copies: Department of 
Fisheries, Great Lakes Laboratory for Fisheries and Aquatic Sciences, Canada Centre for 
Inland Waters, PO Box 5050, Burlington, Ontario, Canada L7R 4A6. 
Vesely, W.E. 1984. Engineering risk analysis. In: Ricci, P., Sagan, L. and Whipple, C. 
(Eds) Technological risk assessment. [This paper provides a useful description of the 
technical approaches to risk assessment.] 
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Glossary 
ACCEPTABLE RISK 
risk that is judged by society to be acceptable 
ACCEPTED RISK 
risk that is apparently accepted by society, for example, driving a car 
ACTUAL RISK 
scientifically calculated or experienced (usually statistical or predicted risk) 
FREQUENCY 
a measure of the number of events that have occurred in some past time period, 
divided by the time period (i.e. a number per time period) 
HAZARD 
a harm or negative outcome 
PERCEIVED RISK 
risk as seen intuitively by individuals or societal groups 
PREDICTED RISK 
risk as measured by systems models using historical data 
REAL RISK 
risk that will be determined by future circumstances, and that therefore cannot be 
measured 
RISK 
probability of the occurrence of harm compounded with the magnitude of a harmful 
event 
RISK ASSESSMENT 
risk determination and evaluation 
RISK DETERMINATION 
risk identification and estimation 
RISK ESTIMATION 
the calculation of the probability of occurrence and the magnitude of the possible 
outcomes 
RISK EVALUATION 
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the determination of the significance or value of the risk, including study of risk 
perception and the tradeoff between perceived risk and perceived benefits 
RISKFACfOR 
something that causes a risk 
RISK IDENTIFICATION 
the identification of all possible sources of risk and the possible outcomes from 
particular actions 
RISK MANAGEMENT 
the making of decisions involving risk and the implementation of these decisions 
SAFETY 
an action is safe if its risks are judged to be acceptable 
STATISTICAL RISK 
risk measured statistically using currently available data 
UNCERTAINTY 
a lack of knowledge arising from changes that are difficult to predict or events 
whose likelihood cannot be accurately predicted 
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